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Abstract
We provide an extention of GU model that incorporates a decision maker who is
averse to inequality of allocations among other agents. We also provide a detaled
discussion on the experiments on dictator games with an exit option.
1 Introduction
This Online Appendix contains two sections. In the first section, we provide an extention of
GU model that incorporates a decision maker who is averse to inequality of allocations be-
tween other agents. In the second section, we provide a detaled discussion on the experiments
on dictator games with an exit option.
2 Extension
In this section, to incorporate inequality aversion, we axiomatize an extended GU model,
in which uS is a maxmin utility function. We consider a decision maker who is averse to
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inequality of allocations among other agents. However, the decision maker is not inequality
averse between himself and another agent. This is an important limitation of this extention.
It is well known that the independence axiom may fail in social context because mixtures
among allocations can offset inequality in the mixed allocation. However, mixing with con-
stant allocations does not offset inequality. Hence, we keep the following weaker version of
the independence axiom:
Definition: A set C ∈ A is called constant over S if pi = pj for any i, j ∈ S and p ∈ C.
Axiom (Weak Independence): Let α ∈ [0, 1] and A,B,C ∈ A . Suppose that C is constant
over S. Then A % B if and only if αA+ (1− α)C % αB + (1− α)C.
We need an additional axiom to make sure that %1 and %S well-defined.
1
Axiom (Separability): For all p1, q1, l1, r1 ∈ ∆(Z) and pS, qS, lS, rS ∈ (∆(Z))
S, (i) (p1, lS) %
(q1, lS) if and only if (p1, rS) % (q1, rS); (ii) (l1, pS) % (l1, qS) if and only if (r1, pS) % (r1, qS).
The next axiom captures inequality aversion among other agents’ allocations.
Axiom (Quasi-Concavity) For any pS, qS ∈ (∆(Z))
S, if pS ∼S qS, then
1
2
pS +
1
2
qS %S pS.
Corollary: The following statements are equivalent:
(a) % satisfies Quasi-Concavity, Weak Independence, and Separability as well as the axioms
in the theorem except Independence.
(b) There exists an extended GU model in which
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) = minαS∈C
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) for
some C ⊂ ∆(S).
Proof: It is easy to see the necessity of the axioms. To show the sufficiency it suffices to
show the following two lemmas. First, instead of Lemma 1, we prove the next lemma by
using the standard argument with the von Neumann-Morgenstern’s theorem and Gilboa and
Schmeidler’s (1989) theorem.
Lemma 1 There exist a mixture linear function u1 on ∆(Z) and a closed subset C of ∆(S)
such that (i) u1 represents %1 on ∆(Z), (ii) there exist z, z ∈ Z such that u1(z) = 1 ≥
1I appreciate a referee who points out the necessity of this axiom.
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u1(p) ≥ 0 = u1(z) for all p ∈ ∆(Z), and (iii)
∑
i∈S αiu(pi) ≡ minα∈C
∑
i∈S αiu1(pi) repre-
sents %S.
Given the above u1 and uS, we define %
∗ in the same way as in the proof of theorem.
Weak Independence of % on A implies Independence of %∗ on A ∗.
Lemma 2 %∗ satisfies Independence*.
Proof of Lemma 2: Fix C∗ ∈ A ∗. For all x ∈ [0, 1], define p(x) = xδz + (1 − x)δz and
pS(x) = (p(x))i∈S. Then, for all u ≡ (u1, uS) ∈ [0, 1]
2, u1(p(u1)) = u1 and
∑
i∈S αiu(pi(uS)) =
uS. Define C = {(p(u1), pS(uS))|u ≡ (u1, uS) ∈ C
∗}. Then, C is constant over S and
u(C) = C∗. Therefore, by Weak Independence, A∗ %∗ B∗ ⇔ A % B ⇔ αA + (1 − α)C %
αB + (1− α)C ⇔ αA∗ + (1− α)C∗ %∗ αB∗ + (1− α)C∗. 
Since %∗ satisfies the same properties as in the proof of the theorem, Lemma 4–8 hold
in the same way. Hence, the sufficiency of the axioms holds with u1 = u1(p1) and uS =
minα∈C
∑
i∈S αiu1(pi). Therefore, Corollary holds. 
3 Discussion on Experiments
In the experiments conducted by Lazear et al. (2012), we could observe that medium-level
donors exit more often than low-level and high-level donors, when playing the dictator game
is subsidized. In the experiments, 96 subjects (48 dictators) participated in five sequential
sessions of dictator games with an exit option. Lazear et al. (2012) provided dictators with
$10 as baseline endowment and, on top of that, added subsidies of $0, $1, $3, $6, and $10 to
the baseline endowment in order. For each subsidy value, dictators decided whether to play
the dictator game or exit. Then, the dictators decided the donation amount publicly if they
did not exit. For each dictator, the left figure in Figure 3 in the main paper (Figure 1 of
this Online Appendix) shows the minimal subsidy needed to play the dictator game and the
3
dictator’s average donated proportion.2 Clearly, the figure shows tendency (i).3
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Figure 1: Figure 3 in the main paper: The relationship between donations and the choice
of exit in Lazear et al. (2012) (left) and Dana et al. (2006) (right). (In the left figure, each
point shows the choice of each subject. The curve is a smooth approximation of the choices.
The right figure shows the percentage of subjects who existed, depending on the proportions
of their donations.)
We found consistent evidence for the tendency in the earliest experiments on dictator
games with an exit option conducted by Dana et al. (2006). Dana et al. (2006) provided
dictators with $10 as an endowment and asked dictators the donation amount before the
dictators knew that they could exit privately. When the dictators exited, they obtained
$9 privately and receivers obtained $0 without knowing that this is a consequence of the
dictators’ choice. The right figure in Figure 3 shows the percentage of dictators who exited
and their (intended) donated proportion, which clearly exhibits the tendency.4
In the experiment conducted by Dana et al. (2006), dictators were anonymous, while in
the treatment conducted by Lazear et al. (2012), receivers could identify dictators. Hence,
2We regressed donated proportion on subsidy size. The estimated coefficient on the subsidy size is
−1.6 · 10−4 (p = 0.887), which is not significantly different from zero. Hence, the donated proportion is
statistically constant across the treatments.
3We made the left figure of Figure 3 based on the no-anonymity treatment in Experiment 2 in Lazear et
al. (2012).
4We made the right figure of Figure 3 based on Figure 1 (p.197) in Dana et al. (2006).
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the consistency between these two experiments, as captured by Figure 3, would support our
hypothesis: as long as playing dictator games is common knowledge among subjects, the
dictator would consider the receiver’s wish that the dictator should act altruistically. Hence,
the dictator could feel pride in acting altruistically by living up to the receiver’s wish and
ashamed of acting selfishly by denying their wish, even though the receiver could not identify
the dictator.
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